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THE AVAILABILITY OF THE WORK PRODUCT OF A
DISQUALIFIED ATTORNEY: WHAT STANDARD?
To fulfill his professional responsibilities, an attorney must be
guided by his obligations both to clients and the legal profession.'
When he represents a client in litigation in which the adverse party
is either a current 2 or a former 3 client, the attorney may be unable
to discharge his obligations 4 He may be unable to preserve the
confidences and secrets of his clients 5 or exercise independent pro-
' These obligations are set forth in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL BESPON-
smirry [hereinafter cited as CODE]. The Code succeeded, in 1970, the ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs [hereinafter cited as CANONS], which were adopted
in 1908. Preface to CODE at i, ii (1976).
The Code has been substantially adopted by the District of Columbia and all
states except California. R. WISE, LEGAL ETmIcs ix (Supp. 1977); Note, Attor-
ney's Conflict of Interest: Representation of Interest Adverse to That of Former
Client, 55 B.U. L. BEv. 61, 65 n.23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B.U. L. REv.
Note]. In the federal courts, the Code has been incorporated into local rules, e.g.,
D. NEB. R. 5B; N.D. OxrL. R. 5(j); E.D. PA. R. 11, or is used as a standard for
ethical conduct. E.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d
225, 227 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804,
810 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the For-
mer Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1033 n.36 (1977).
The Code has recently been subject to increasing criticism, e.g., G. HAZARD,
EmTcs IN THE PRACncE OF LAw (1978); J. IrErmmw, CIsIS AT =s BAR
(1978), and currently is under revision. Both criticism of the Code and speculation
on possible future revisibn are outside the scope of this Comment.
2This situation is referred to as "simultaneous representation." This term en-
compasses litigation in which an attorney represents adverse parties. Such an oc-
currence is rare, however, and will not be considered in this Comment.
3 This situation is referred to as "successive representation."
4 The discussion in this Comment is limited to conflicts generated exclusively in
private legal practice. The peculiar problems of a former government attorney
in private practice are confronted in DR 9-101(B). See generally G. HAzARD,
supra note 1, at 107-19; J. LmBEBMA, supra note 1, at 176-80; Jordan, Ethical
Issues Arising from Present or Past Government Service, in PROFESsIONAL REsPoN-
siouxrx 171-217 (D. Ream. ed. 1978); Kaufman, The Former Government Ator-
ney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HAnv. L. Rnv. 657 (1957); Com-
ment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J.
1025 (1977).
5 "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." CODE,
supra note 1, Canon 4.
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client.
DR 4-101(A). See notes 33 & 36 infra.
An attorney who represents party A in a lawsuit in which the opposing party,
B, is a current or former client, may misuse confidences or secrets obtained during
his representation of B to further As cause. See DR 4-101(B)(2). Such misuse
of confidences or secrets is more likely when the attorney represents the two clients
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fessional judgment on their behalf; 6 moreover, such dual represen-
tation may appear to be improper.7  To protect the adverse party
and to promote the dignity of the legal profession, the court may
disqualify 8 the attorney.
As motions to disqualify have become more prevalent," how-
ever, courts have recognized that disqualification inevitably injures
the abandoned client 10 in the litigation.." Not only does disquali-
fication deprive him of counsel of his choice, but it compels him
to relegate his case to an attorney who is unfamiliar with the cir-
cumstances and legal issues.12 Moreover, it forces him to bear the
in related matters, because it is more likely that B's confidences can help A. Thus,
when the matters are substantially related, courts presume that the attorney has
learned confidences from B that can help A. See, e.g., T. C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see also
notes 40-44 & 108-09 infra & accompanying text. In view of the proscription
embodied in Canon 9, see note 7 infra, client B typically will be a former rather
than a present client.
6 "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of
a Client." CODE, supra note 1, Canon 5. Canon 5 concerns the attorney's ability
to represent a client when he may be influenced by personal interests or the interests
of others. See EC 5-1. These considerations are most relevant when an attorney
is engaged in simultaneous representation, because his obligation to one client may
temper his representation of the other. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 229 (7th Cir. 1978). See generally text accom-
panying notes 46-59 infra.
"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
CODE, supra note 1, Canon 9. The attorney's obligation to promote the honor and
integrity of the legal profession is threatened by conduct which may appear to
laymen to be improper. E.g., EC's 9-2 & 9-6. See generally text accompanying
notes 61-73 infra.
8 See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969);
B.U. L. Bnv. Note, supra note 1, at 61. See generally B.U. L. Rv. Note, supra
note 1; Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to
Former Clients, 64 YArE L.J. 917 (1955). Although an attorney may be disquali-
fied for many reasons, e.g., DRs 5-101 to 5-104, 6-101, 7-101 to 7-110, 9-102, this
Comment considers only those occasions in which disqualification is grounded upon
representation of clients whose interests are in conflict or are potentially adverse.
9 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1202 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 87 (1978).
10 This Comment will use the term "abandoned client" to refer to the party
whose attorney was disqualified, and who later requests that the disqualified attor-
ney's work product be made available to substitute counsel. See generally notes
16-18 infra.
The "disqualifying party" is the party who has successfully moved for dis-
qualification and who later opposes the work product request.
11 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979);
W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976).
12The effects of court ordered disqualification are detailed in B.U. L. REV.
Note, supra note 1, at 65. The severity of the damage done to the abandoned
client depends in large part upon the complexity of the factual and legal issues
involved, and the stage to which the litigation has progressed. When disqualifica-
tion occurs in a complex case, or at an advanced stage of the lawsuit, the subse-
quent attorney may be unable to absorb .adequately the nuances of the legal and
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additional expense of successor counsel's fee.13 Hence, courts are
now becoming more reluctant to disqualify attorneys. 14 Indeed,
even when attorneys are disqualified, courts are receptive to the
efforts of abandoned clients to ameliorate the detrimental effects
of the disqualification. 15
One approach which the abandoned client may take is to move
that the written work of the disqualified attorney be made available
to substitute counsel. 6 Typically, the abandoned client will apprise
the court of the importance of this written work to successor coun-
sel's familiarization with the case. He will argue that the motion
must be granted to avoid the expensive and time-consuming process
of duplicating the written work.'7 The opposing party normally
will respond that granting the motion would undermine the effec-
tiveness and defeat the purpose of the disqualification order.'3
The question of the availability of the written work product ' 9
of an attorney who is disqualified because of dual representation was
factual matters involved. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d
Cir. 1976); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1306
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd in part sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th
Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
Is See cases cited in note 12 supra.
14 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
15 See, e.g., Norman Norell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp.
127, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (attorney, disqualified pursuant to DR 5-101(B)'s
lawyer-witness prohibition, permitted to remain on the case until the trial).
36 A client who makes such a request is likely to ask the court to permit the
disqualified attorney to explain the contents of that written work to subsequent
counsel. See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D.
Wis. 1977), rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The scope of this
Comment is restricted to the question of the availability of the written work of the
disqualified attorney.
17 See Brief for Appellants at 34-35, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
38 Brief for Appellee at 16-17, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp.,
571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625, 627 (E.D. Wis. 1977), rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978)
(en bane)).
19 The term "work producet" is used in this Comment to comprise all written
documents an attorney produces in preparation for, investigation of, and during
the course of a lawsuit.
Since Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), an attorney's work product,
more broadly defined, has enjoyed a limited immunity from discovery, now em-
bodied in Fwu. IL Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See note 125 infra. In this context, there is
extensive case law on work products. See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 412
(1971).
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squarely confronted, for the first time, in First Wisconsin Mortgage
Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp.20 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit sitting en banc, reversing decisions of a three-judge
circuit panel 21 and the district court,22 held that the work product
is not prohibited per se from being made available to the substitute
attorney.23 Under the court's approach, availability would be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis by the trial judge, who "should be
satisfied that there is no taint of confidentiality or other improper
advantage gained from the dual representation." 24 The court
placed the burden on the disqualifying party25 to point to actual
confidences or secrets or other improper advantages which might be
used against it if the work product motion were granted.
26
This Comment will show that this approach to the availability
of the work product is improper.27  It is impracticable because it
requires the trial court to spend considerable time examining
voluminous documents which would be unlikely to reveal con-
fidential information contained in, or used in the preparation of,
20 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977), rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en
banc). The propriety of extending a disqualification order to the work product of
the attorney has been given summary consideration in a few cases, all of which
resulted in the work product being made available. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579
F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
567 F.2d 225, 236 (2d Cir. 1977); Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823
(1969); Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-1 TRADE CAsEs (CCH)
ff 62,568 (E.D. Ark. April 5, 1979); Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers,
Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691, 695-97 (D. Conn. 1976); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F. Supp. 371, 400-01 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
21571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
2274 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
23584 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1978).
24 Id. 211 n.6. The disqualification occurred when the law firm which had
represented both First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust and First Wisconsin Corporation
(as well as the two other parties joined as defendants) as general counsel, sought
to represent First Wisconsin Corporation in a securities laws action brought against
it by First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust. The firm had advised both principal parties,
for example, on tax matters, and advised First Wisconsin Corporation on the
creation of the trust. Thus, the firm aided in structuring the trust and in loan
transactions involving both parties. Id. 202-03. The court decided that since the
requested work product, summaries of loan files, prepared by the disqualified law
firm for First Wisconsin Corporation for use in the litigation, did not contain any
confidential information, id. 204, it should be made available to successor counsel.
25 See note 10 supra.
26 See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 209.
2 7
See generally text accompanying notes 102-44 infra.
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the work product.28  Further, -the burden placed on the disqualify-
ing party is unjustified in the light of ethical principles which have
guided the courts.29
The purpose of this Comment is to devise a standard of avail-
ability for the work product of the disqualified attorney. This
standard must be comprehensive,30 workable, and consistent with
the ethical principles that guide courts in dual representation cases.
Availability should be a function of the ethical obligation that dis-
qualification was intended to enforce. Unless denial of the work
product request is also necessary to enforce that obligation, the
court should make the work product available to subsequent counsel.
Initially, the Comment will examine the usual grounds for
disqualification for dual representation and the purpose served by
the corresponding remedies. The Comment will then analyze the
relationship between the availability of the work product and the
ground for the disqualification. It concludes that the court should
authorize the turnover of the work product unless the disqualifica-
tion is grounded on the possibility that the disqualified attorney
would use confidences or secrets to the detriment of the disqualifying
party.3'
When the disqualification is based on that possibility, the court
should employ a balancing approach: only if the possibility that
confidences or secrets will be used against the disqualifying party
outweighs the deleterious effects of unavailability on the abandoned
client should the court deny the work product request. Finally,
the Comment will apply this balancing analysis to First Wisconsin,
3 2
concluding that the court reached the proper result.
2 8 See text accompanying notes 112-21 infra.
29 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 211 (Castle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see notes 117-21 infra & accompanying
text. Indeed, while the majority gave reasons for rejecting a per se rule, id. 208-09,
it made no effort to justify its extraordinarily flexible standard.
30 First Wisconsin is limited to disqualifications based on Canon 4. For a
discussion, in the context of First Wisconsin, of disqualification and access to work
product when the disqualified attorney represented multiple parties who became
adverse, see Note, Attorney Disqualification and Access to Work Product: Toward
a Principled Rule, 63 Coarr L. REV. 1054 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Access to
Work Product]. See also Comment, Attorney Work Product--New Counsel May
Be Granted Access to Predisqualification Work Product of Prior Counsel, 54 NoaRE
DAMm LAW. 544 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Work Product]; 32 VAND.
L. REv. 819 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VAND. L. REv.].
This Comment will examine all grounds for disqualification for dual representa-
tion: Canons 4, 5, and 9.
31 See text accompanying notes 74-101, infra.
32 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir.
1978) (en banc).
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I. PURPOSE BEHIND DISQUALrFICATION UNDER CANONS
•4, 5, AND 9
A. Canon 4-Preservation of Confidences and Secrets 33
Canon 4 34 embodies the principle that the useful relation be-
tween attorney and client depends on full freedom and honesty
of communication between them.85 For the client to feel free to
relate all information necessary for effective representation, he must
be assured that information that may be detrimental to him, or
that he would not want generally known, will not be disclosed by
the attorney.36 Consequently, the attorney is foreclosed from ever
revealing the information confided in him.
37
That attorneys are obligated to nondisclosure encourages the
public to confide in them and to rely on the adversary system to
33 See generally note 5 supra. Disqualifications for dual representation are
often grounded on some combination of the three canons to be discussed in this
Comment. For purposes of illustration, however, it is useful to focus on each canon
as the sole ground for disqualification.
This Comment treats "confidences" and "secrets" as having the same ethical
implications. See ECs 4-1 to 4-6; DR 4-101; note 36 infra. For one possible dis-
tinction between "secrets" and "confidences," with resulting effects on disqualification
and work product availability, see Access to Work Product, supra- note 30.
34 "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
Canon 4 derives from Canons 6 and 37 of the old canons of ethics. CANONS,
supra note 1.
Canon 6 reads: "The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance
of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
Canon 37 reads:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his
employees; and neither of them should accept employment which involves
or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the
private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage
of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there
are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not
continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the
performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
35 See, e.g., EC 4-1; W.H. TAFT, ETHcs LnT SERVICE 31-32 (1915); Elson,
Responsibilities to the Client, in PnoFEssIoNAL REsPoNsmrLrry, supra note 4, at 84.
36 See ABA CoMM. ON PtoEssioNAL ETmcs, OPnTioNs, No. 91 (1933). Ac-
cordingly, the information protected from disclosure by Canon 4 is not confined to
that protected by the attorney-client privilege but includes all information imparted
by the client that he would not want to be revealed. See ECs 4-1 to 4-6; DR 4-101.
See also notes 5 & 33 supra. Moreover, this protection from disclosure is not ex-
punged even where the information is part of the public record or available from
other sources. EC 4-4. See H. DRman, LEGAL ETMICS 135 (1953).
37DR 4-101(B). The attorney's obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client continues after their professional relationship terminates. EC 4-6.
See In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 953 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897). There are certain circum-
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resolve legal problems." When an-attorney who breaches this obli-
gation to his client is disqualified, the public's trust in the profes-
sion and system is reinforced. If the disqualification arises out of
dual representation, however, it is intended to serve a more immedi-
ate purpose-insuring fundamental fairness in the judicial process
by prohibiting the use of a client's secrets or confidences against
his interests.3 9
Although the way an attorney uses secrets or confidences of a
former client may be obvious in some cases, it is often too subtle
to be perceived by a court.40 Indeed, an attorney may unconsciously
transform such information into a disadvantage for the prior client.41
Thus, courts do not require the former client to point to specific
confidences or secrets which may be used against him.42 He is obli-
gated to show only that there is a possibility that any confidences
may be used against him.43 This possibility presumably outweighs
stances, however, under which the attorney may disclose confidences or secrets of a
client. See DR 4-101(C). These are not relevant to the issues discussed in this
Comment.
38 See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960). See gen-
erally R. WISE, LEGAL ETmcs 160 (1966).
39 City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
206 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 996 (1978); see B.U. L. Rv. Note, supra note 1, at 64. DR 4-101(B)(2)
prohibits an attorney from knowingly using a confidence or secret of his client to
the client's disadvantage.
For example, if an attorney involved in litigation against a former client uses
information acquired in the earlier representation to gain an advantage for his
present client, the former client's rights would be clearly prejudiced. Information
he disclosed on the assumption that it would not be used for purposes other than his
representation would be used to his detriment. In such a case, the former.client
could be protected by such misuse only if the attorney is disqualified.
40 See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973);
see notes 117-21 infra & accompanying text.
41 Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
42 To require the former client to point to specific confidences and secrets would
compel him to disclose the very matters he seeks to preserve. Id.
43 Id. The former client is required, rather, to show that
the matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney
appears on behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the matters
or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him ....
The Court will assume that during the course of the former representation
confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter
of the representation.
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
Some courts have taken issue with this irrebuttable presumption that, if the
matters are substantially related, then information bearing on the present litigation
was disclosed to the attorney by the former client. See City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573
F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Canadian Gulf
Liies, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1976); af.
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the adverse effects of disqualification on the present client.44 Dis-
qualification under Canon 4 in the context of dual representation,
then, serves two purposes. First, and most important, it protects
the rights of the party seeking disqualification. 45 Second, it main-
tains public confidence in the legal system and profession.
B. Canon 5-Exercise of Independent Professional Judgment
Canon 5 46 concerns the attorney's duty to "determine his
actions by the single criterion of what would best serve his client's
interests." 47 It is grounded on the principle that the attorney's
loyalty to his client will be compromised if he must reconcile the
interests of one client with those of another.48 In essence, Canon 5
Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 642 (7th Cir. 1979) (inflexible irrebuttable presumptions could lead to un-
reasonable results under unforeseen circumstances); note 111 infra (strict inter-
pretation of "substantial relationship"); note 129 infra (presumption rebuttable
when applied to information learned from others in firm).
4 4 As courts have grown more aware of the deleterious effects of disqualifica-
tion, some have begun to question this assumption. See Government of India v.
Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc. v.
Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691, 694-97 (D. Conn. 1976); cf. Novo
Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
642 (7th Cir. 1979) (irrebuttable presumption may not always lead to proper
balance). See also notes 12-13 supra & accompanying text.
45 The primacy of this purpose is shown by the holding that when confidences
will be used against a client, Canon 4 precludes his consent to that use; on the
other hand, when they will not be used against him, his consent is effective.
Contrast Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 228-29 (7th
Cir. 1978), with id. 229 n.9, and EC's 4-2 & 4-5, DR 4-101(C)(1). Consent can
therefore cure any deleterious effect of the release of confidential information except
for its use against the client. Thus, the client's protection is the primary purpose
of Canon 4.
46"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf
of a Client." Canon 5 derives from Canon 6 of the CANONS, supra note 1, which
says:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by ex-
press consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another client requires him to oppose.
4 7 Weddington, A Fresh Approach To Preserving Independent Judgment-
Canon 6 of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 Ansz. L. REv. 31,
34 (1969) (the final draft of the Code changed the designation of Canon 6 to
Canon 5).
48 EC 5-1 declares:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of com-
promising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the in-
terests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted
to dilute his loyalty to his client.
The ethical considerations under Canon 5 are categorized by the interests which
may affect an attorney's judgment: his personal interests, EC's 5-2 to 5-13; those
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promotes'professional zeal: 49. an attorney who is subject t6 conflicting
interests is unlikely to devote himself fully to his client's cause.50
Moreover, he demeans the legal profession in the eyes of the public.5 '
In the context of dual representation, Canon 5 is most often
implicated when an attorney engages in simultaneous representa-
tionP2 The attorney may temper his outside representation of the
disqualifying party because of loyalties to his client in the present
litigation. 3 Therefore, a Canon 5 violation is not determined by
the relationship between the subject matters of the two representa-
of multiple clients, EC's 5-14 to 5-20; and the desires of third persons, EC's 5-21
to 5.24.
49 See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). On its face, Canon 7, "A Lawyer Should Rep-
resent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law," seems to be more central
to this purpose. Its concern, however, is with the attorney's responsibility to provide
the client with complete counsel and advice, enabling him to make an informed
choice on the course of conduct he will follow. Monroe H. Freedman, Personal
Responsibility in a Professional System, Address at the Pope John XXIII Lecture
at Catholic University (Oct. 28, 1977), reprinted in 27 CAmH. U. L. REV. 191, 200
(1978). Although Canons 5 and 7 do overlap in the context of dual representa-
tion, Canon 5, not Canon 7, has been relied upon by the courts.
Io Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 229 (7th Cir.
1978). As the Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility stated: "The Dis-
ciplinary Rules of Canon 5 bring into professional regulation, and with some
specificity, the ancient maxim that one cannot serve two masters." ABA Co~mi.
oN Ermcs & PRoFrssroNAL REspoNsmrrrry, Formal Opinion No. 342 at 2 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
51 The duty of loyalty is undermined because the client feels that the attorney
has failed to abide by his unspoken commitment to enforce the client's rights to the
fullest extent. At the same time, the public loses respect for the profession, because
it believes that attorneys are more concerned with financial benefit than the needs
of their clients. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of the Bar of Hartford County v.
Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A,2d 82, 84 (1964).
5 2 See A. KAuFmAx, PROBLEMS IN PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONsIBILITY 46 (1976);
note 2 supra & accompanying text. In successive representation, the interest which
may impair the attorneys independent professional judgment is that of a former client
rather than a present client. Thus, the attorney is less likely to be influenced in
his representation than if the adversary party were a current client.
In successive representation, Canon 4 is more important. See A. KAuFmAN,
supra at 45. When Canon 5 is implicated in cases of successive representation, it is
usually in addition to Canon 4. See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566
F.2d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Moritz v. Medi-
cal Protection Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977); note 55 infra.
53 IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978). For example, the
attorney might represent A against B in an antitrust suit, while representing B in
an uihrelated labor matter. B might move to disqualify in the antitrust suit. fear-
ing that the attorney's loyalty to A may affect his representation of B in the labor
matter. On the other hand, if A fears that the attorney will temper his represen-
tation of him in the antitrust suit, he could simply discharge him. (A cannot move
for disqualification in the labor matter because he is not a party.) Indeed, if A
knew, before the litigation, of the attorney's relationship with B and was apprehen-
sive about its effect on the antitrust suit, A could have hired a different attorney.
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tions; 14 instead, the attorney is disqualified under DR 5-105 55 when
"there will be . .. [an] actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or
diminution in the vigor of his representation," 56 if he continues
to participate in the lawsuit. Thus, the primary purpose of dis-
qualification under Canon 5 is to insure loyalty to the client. Un-
like Canon 4, however, Canon 5 does not protect the disqualifying
party's interests in the current litigation.
57
Another purpose behind disqualification under Canon 5 is to
maintain public confidence in the loyalty and integrity of the bar.sb
The standard for disqualification under Canon 5, with its emphasis
564 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 229 (7th Cir.
1978); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1978). There need be
no relationship between the representations, because "[the propriety of this conduct
must be measured not so much against the similarities in litigation, as against the
duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his clients." Cinema
5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); see id. 1387.
55 DR 5-105(B) states:
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by his representation of another client or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
"'Differing interests' include every interest that will adversely affect either the
judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, incon-
sistent, diverse, or other interest." CODE, supra note 1, Definitions.
56Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original). The prohibition against an appearance of impropriety is
embodied in Canon 9. See text accompanying notes 61-73, infra.
Some courts have used the Canon 4 "substantial relationship" test, see note 43
supra, in Canon 5 successive representation cases. When Canon 4 also has been
implicated, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp.
193, 205-08 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 996 (1978), reliance on the "substantial relationship" standard as the
"test for disqualification" may be justified; the court presumes that a breach of
the Canon 4 duty to preserve confidences and secrets is necessarily a breach of the
Canon 5 duty of undivided loyalty. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 567 F.2d 225, 234 n.17 (2d Cir. 1977). However, when the court rejects
a Canon 4 claim and still utilizes the "substantial relationship" test, e.g., Moritz v.
Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 875 (W.D. Wis. 1977), it is using an
improper standard. Unlike a Canon 4 situation, there is no reason to presume that
a substantial relationship between the two representations will cause a breach of
loyalty under Canon 5. Cf. note 43 supra & accompanying text (reasons for sub-
stantial relationship presumption under Canon 4).
5 7 When the disqualifying party is a former client, there is no danger, in the
Canon 5 context, that his representation will be impaired. In this situation, the
primary purpose of disqualification is maintaining public confidence in the loyalty
and integrity of the bar. See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra.
58 See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978). The assump-
tion in the Canon 5 case, as under Canon 4, is that the need for the disqualification
outweighs the detrimental effect to the abandoned client. E.g., City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 195-96 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
aff'd mere., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978):
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on actual or apparent conflict in loyalties, 9 is evidence that the
public perception of the legal profession underlies the remedy.
Hence, the attorney who is disqualified under Canon 5 is an ex-
ample of the absolute fidelity of the bar. Still, although the dis-
qualifying party's confidence in the loyalty of members of the legal
profession may be restored by the disqualification, his position in
the present litigation will be unaffected.60  Therefore, while Canons
4 and 5 both constitute grounds for disqualification in the context
of dual representation, the purpose served by their respective rem-
edies is different.
C. Canon 9-Appearance of Impropriety
In contrast to the proscriptions of Canons 4 and 5, Canon 9's
declaration that "[a] [l]awyer [s]hould [a]void [e]ven the [a]ppearance
of [p]rofessional [i]mpropriety" relates to all aspects of an attorney's
conduct.6 1  Implicit in the old Canons of Professional Ethics,62 the
admonition of Canon 9 is particularly applicable to situations of
dual representation. 63 Canon 9 reflects the bar's concern that some
attorney conduct which is in fact ethical may appear unethical to a
layman," undermining public confidence in the legal profession
and judicial system.65
59 See note 55 supra & accompanying text. In dual representation situations,
Canons 5 and 9 serve essentially the same purpose. See text accompanying notes
65-66 infra. In other situations, however, the purpose of Canon 5 is closer to that
of Canon 4; that is, it assures that neither party to the litigation is prejudiced by
the actions of an attorney. See, e.g., DR 5-102(B) (counsel testifying against his
client).
60 See note 57 supra & accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D. Ill.), re'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978), rev'd in part on other grounds sub noam.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). EC
9-2 provides: "When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should deter-
mine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession."
62 See, e.g., CANONS, supra note 1, Nos. 6, 36, & 37; Kaufman, supra note 4, at
659. The command "abstain from all appearance of evil" is found in 1 Thessa-
lonians 5:22.
6 3 See Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WAsH. L. REv. 807, 810 (1977).
64Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976);
see EC 9-2; ABA Conmr. ON PRoFssroNAL ETmcs, INFORMAL OPNi-ox No. 885
(1965).
65 Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); see
Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. Rav. 807, 810 (1977); ef. Kramer v.
Scientific Instrument Co., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[lImportant as
it was that people should get justice, it was even more important that they should
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Although Canons 5 and 9 can serve the same purpose in the
dual representation context, there are differences in their ap-
plicability. Whereas Canon 5 (as well as Canon 4) refers to the
attorney's obligation to his client, Canon 9 refers only to his duty
to his profession.66 Moreover, as a rationale for disqualification,
Canon 9 is weaker than either Canon 4 or 5 because no unethical
act or wrongdoing need occur for it to be invoked.67 This tenuous
basis is compounded in the case of disqualification for dual repre-
sentation 68 because none of the Canon 9 disciplinary rules is im-
plicated.69 Thus, disqualification is grounded on a literal reading
of the Canon, language "too vague . . . to be useful." 70 Hence,
courts caution against indiscriminate use of Canon 9 as a ground for
disqualification for dual representation.
71
Consequently, when courts invoke Canon 9 in dual representa-
tion cases, they are reluctant to assume that the benefits to be de-
rived from disqualification outweigh the harm to the abandoned
client.72 Instead, they require that the likelihood of public suspi-
be made to feel and see that they were getting it.") (quoting Lord Herschel! in
2 J. B. ATL&Y, VicToAN CHNcEUErOrs 460 (1908)).
66 EC 9-6 states:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of
his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and
judges thereof; ... to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal
profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients
and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety
but also the appearance of impropriety.
6 7Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). There need be only an appearance of impropriety
for Canon 9 to be contravened.
68 Unlike Canons 4 and 5, Canon 9 is applied with equal frequency to successive
and simultaneous representation. In view of its flimsy ethical basis, however, Canon
9 is not often the sole ground for disqualification. See text accompanying notes 66
& 67 supra and 69-73 infra.
69 The only disciplinary rules under Canon 9 are DR 9-101, "Avoiding Even
the Appearance of Impropriety," and DR 9-102, "Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client." Neither relates to dual representation.
70 ABA Comm. oN ETmcs & PaOFEsSIoNAuL REsPoNsmrry, Formal Opinion
No. 342 at 5 n.17 (1975).
71 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)
("[Wihen there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety
is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the
rarest cases."); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp.
193, 205 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mnem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 996 (1978). See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602,
609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 905 (1978); International Elec. Corp.
v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975).
72 When Canon 9 has been invoked in other contexts, however, courts have
been more apt to approve of this assumption. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d
1085, 1092-93 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1977).
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cion or obloquy outweigh the social interests which would be served
by the attorney's continued participation in the case.73  Thus,
prevention of suspicion or obloquy is the exclusive purpose behind
disqualification under Canon 9.
.I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PURPOSE BEHIND DISQUALIFICATION
AND AVAiLABILITY OF WoRK PRODUCT
When an attorney is disqualified for dual representation, courts
assume, implicitly 74 or explicitly,75 that the need to prevent the
evils which triggered disqualification outweighs the adverse effects
of disqualification on the abandoned client.76 The work product
is concededly the fruit of the representation for which counsel was
disqualified.7 7  If the court denies a motion to make the work
product available, it implicitly uses the same balance that underlay
the disqualification decision. However, if disqualification alone
eliminates the evils which necessitated it, then denial of the work
product request can have no further benefits.
Denial of the work product motion also increases substantially
the harm to the abandoned client. Whereas disqualification limits
prospectively the abandoned client's choice of counsel, denial of the
work product deprives him of services already rendered and paid for.
The abandoned client suffers the expense and delay of duplicating
the work product.7s He also risks being deprived of effective as-
sistance of counsel because successor counsel may be unable to
duplicate important parts of the work product.79
In these circumstances, the further adverse effects on the
abandoned client outweigh the reasons for denial of the work
product: denial is unjustified. Only if denying the work product
helps to accomplish the purpose behind disqualification should the
abandoned client be forced to bear the burdens of delay, expense,
and possibly inadequate representation.80
7 3 Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976).
Moreover, there must also be a reasonable possibility that some specifically identi-
fiable impropriety did occur. See generally Note, Appearance of Impropriety as the
Sole Ground for Disqualification, 31 U. MmMI L. REv. 1516 (1977).
74 See text accompanying note 44 supra (Canon 4); note 58 supra (Canon 5).
t5 See text accompanying note 73 supra (Canon 9).
76 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
.77 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 17, at 30.
78 See text accompanying notes 131-38 infra.
79 See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
80 Brief for Appellants, supra note 17, at 34; see text accompanying notes 139-
44 infra.
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A. Disqualification Under Canon 4
Disqualification for dual representation under Canon 4 is pri-
marily intended to insure that the disqualifying party's 81 confidences
and secrets will not be used to his detriment.8 2 Disqualification pre-
vents the disqualified attorney from misusing confidences, but it
neglects the problem of the work product: the work product may
contain, or be a product of, confidential information. If the sub-
stitute attorney has access to a tainted work product, confidences
may be used to the detriment of the disqualifying party, defeating
the primary purpose of disqualification.
When a court disqualifies an attorney under Canon 4, it as-
sumes that the possibility of misuse of the disqualifying party's con-
fidences and secrets outweighs the harm to the abandoned client.
83
A motion to gain access to the work product of an already disquali-
fied attorney, however, does not require adherence to this assump-
tion. Disqualification substantially reduces the possibility of mis-
use of confidences: only those confidences which are embodied in the
work product, rather than all those entrusted to disqualified counsel,
can be misused.8 Furthermore, the substitute counsel may be un-
able to use confidences which are in the work product because they
may be so deeply embedded that he cannot perceive them.
Nevertheless, granting the work product motion may possibly
undermine the disqualification. Whether this possibility outweighs
the harm to the abandoned client hinges on the facts of the indi-
vidual case.8 Availability of the work product, therefore, must be
determined by those facts8 6
B. Disqualification Under Canon 5
Disqualification for dual representation under Canon 5 serves
two purposes: preserving an attorney's loyalty to his client and pub-
81 The disqualifying party will likely be a former client. See note 5 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 33-45 supra.
88 See note 44 supra & accompanying text.
84 Disqualification eliminates, inter alia, unconscious misuse of secrets. Emle
Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). See also text
accompanying notes 107-30 infra.
85 See text accompanying notes 102-44 infra. In First Wisconsin, the three-
judge panel, affirming the decision of the district court, decided that the work product
should be per se precluded from being turned over to the successor attorney be-
cause availability would be inconsistent with the disqualification order under Canon
4. 571 F.2d 390, 396-98 (7th Cir. 1978). This decision was reversed en bane
because such a per se rule fails to take into account the interests of the abandoned
client as well as any peculiar factual variations. 584 F.2d 201, 204-11 (7th Cir.
1978).
86 See generally text accompanying notes 102-44 infra.
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lic confidence in the bar.87 Denial of a work product niotion -en-
hances neither purpose and creates additional harm to the aban-
doned client. Therefore, when disqualification is based on a Canon
5 violation, the work product request should be granted.
When Canon 4 is violated, the danger requiring disqualifica-
tion-possibility of misuse of confidences-may persist in the work
product. In contrast, in a Canon 5 disqualification, this danger
does not exist because the work product does not contain the con-
flict of loyalties that required the attorney's disqualification. The
disqualifying party's claim, rather, is that the attorney's loyalty is
diverted in an outside matter.88 Thus, denial of the request
cannot enhance the first purpose behind Canon 5 disqualification.
At the same time, denial of the work product request does not
enhance the second purpose of Canon 5 disqualification, preservation
of public confidence by demonstrating that loyalty to clients is a
fundamental responsibility of a lawyer. Once a lawyer is disquali-
fied, it is extremely unlikely that public confidence will be sig-
nificantly bolstered by denial of the work product motion.8 9
Unlike disqualification, denial of the work product request is essen-
tially a penalty against the abandoned client: 90 its effects are not
felt by the disqualified attorney, the individual who has breached an
obligation, because he is no longer involved in the case. Thus,
although disqualification of the offending attorney may promote
public confidence in the bar, denial of the work product motion
does not further that end.
Indeed, by denying the work product motion when such a sanc-
tion serves no constructive purpose, the court may eviscerate its dis-
qualification order. By compelling the abandoned client to pay
an attorney to duplicate work already done, the court may create
the very suspicion of the integrity of the legal profession that Canon
5 seeks to avoid.91 Moreover, the delays in litigation accompanying
87 See text accompanying notes 46-59 supra.
8 8 See note 53 supra & accompanying text.
89 In First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 216 n.6
(7th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (Castle J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
the dissenting judges recognized that when an attorney is disqualified for simul-
taneous representation under Canon 5, the purpose of disqualification is not under-
mined by approval of a work product request.
90 Id. 208 (majority opinion).
91 In one survey, 68% of the respondents agreed that "[mlost lawyers charge
more'for their services than they are worth." B. CunRAN, THE LWAL NEEns oF.
=PUBLc 231 (1977) (joint ABA-American Bar Foundation survey).
1979]
1622 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:1607
such- duplication reinforce the public's perception of the legal system
as inefficient.
92
In a Canon 5 case, the adverse effects of denial of the work
product motion clearly outweigh the support such denial may lend
to the purpose behind the disqualification. Although there may be
limited situations in which the court should deny a work product
motion,93 the work product should be made available in the typical
Canon 5 case.
C. Disqualification Under Canon 9
Disqualification for dual representation under Canon 9 is not
a punishment for unethical action; rather, the court disqualifies
the attorney because his conduct is vulnerable to misinterpretation
which could disparage the bar in the eyes of the public.94 Conse-
quently, courts disqualify an attorney under Canon 9 only if the
possibility of public suspicion outweighs the adverse effects of
disqualification. 95
When a client whose attorney has been disqualified under
Canon 9 submits a work product request, the court must consider
whether granting the request will increase the likelihood of public
suspicion. Disqualification, however, all but eliminates this likeli-
hood: if the attorney has appeared to act improperly, his expulsion
from the case eliminates the cause of public obloquy.
9 6
Although it has been argued that the likelihood of public
suspicion can never be entirely erased unless the attorney's work
product is also eliminated from the case,97 it is important to em-
phasize that the appearance of impropriety lies in the conduct of the
attorney. By undertaking dual representation, he places himself
in a position in which he appears to be doing something wrong.
Because it is his position, and not the work he actually does, which
gives rise to the disqualification, his disqualification alone should
92 The problem of delays in litigation is given thoughtful treatment in Lasker,
The Court Crunch: A View From the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245 (1977). See also note
132 infra.
9 3 In rare cases, the disqualifying party may be able to show that the work
product may carry forward the ethical violation which caused disqualification. In
these cases, the court should use the same balancing approach as for Canon 4.
See note 104 and text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
94 See text accompanying notes 64-73 supra.
95 Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976);
see notes 72 & 73 supra & accompanying text.
96 Brief for Appellants, supra note 17, at 33.
97 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir.),
rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
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suffice to extinguish that appearance. Still, if the substitute at-
torney appears to be acting improperly by using the work product,
the likelihood of public suspicion may remain although the work
product itself remains untainted.
Even if use of the work product does remotely contribute to the
possibility of public suspicion, however, the harm to the abandoned
client from denying the work product motion clearly outweighs
that possibility.98 The burden placed on the abandoned client when
any work product request is denied is great; 99 it would be mani-
festly unjust' 00 to impose this burden without adequate justifica-
tion. Hence, in the typical Canon 9 case, the work product should
be made available. 101
III. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR AvAILABILrrY OF WORK PRODUCT
When the court determines whether to grant a work product
motion, it strikes a balance between, on the one hand, the pos-
sible enhancement of both the disqualifying party's rights and the
public's perception of the legal profession, and, on the other, the
added harm to the abandoned client. Typically, when the work
product motion follows a disqualification grounded on Canon 5 or
9, the interest of the abandoned client prevails. Because the work
product in either case relates only insignificantly to the ethical obli-
gation the attorney was disqualified for threatening,10 2 the court
should create a presumption favoring the abandoned client; 103 thus,
the work product would normally be made available.104
98It is important to recall that Canon 9 disqualification is not based on any
actual misconduct of the attorney; rather, it is grounded on the appearance of un-
ethical behavior. Therefore, such appearance should be strong to outweigh the harm
where the attorney has done nothing wrong. See text accompanying notes 64-73
supra.
99 See text accompanying notes 131-44 infra.
10 0 As Judge Gurfein stated in the context of a disqualification motion, "When
we find an area of uncertainty, . . . we must use our judicial process to make our
own decision in the interests of justice to all concerned:' J.P. Foley & Co. v.
Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
101 Just as in Canon 5 cases, there may be exceptions. See note 104 and text
accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
10 2 See text accompanying notes 87-101 supra.
103 Most presumptions arise because courts have recognized that "proof of fact
B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and
time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it" C.
McCouNucK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvmrENcn § 343 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
Because it is so probable that, if the disqualification is grounded on Canon 5 or 9,
then the interests of the abandoned client prevail, the court should create such a
presumption. . The work product should usually be made available in these cases.
But see note 104 infra.
104 The disqualifying party, of course, may attempt to rebut this presumption,
but the possibility that he will succeed is remote. In light of the tenuous relation-
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On the contrary, when disqualification is grounded on Canon
4, the possible prejudice to the disqualifying party's rights may out-
weigh the harm to the abandoned client. 05 The court cannot
presume that the balance favors the interests of one party; instead,
the court should examine the facts in a case-by-case approach. 05
A. Likelihood That Confidences or Secrets Will
Be Used Against Adverse Party
Granting the work product motion harms the interests of the
disqualifying party only if the work product contains confidences
or secrets which will be used against him. Such harm will occur
only if two other events have occurred. First, the abandoned client
must have communicated confidences to the disqualified attorney
relevant to the present litigation; second, those confidences must
have found their way into the work product.
107
1. Relevance of the Presumed Confidences or Secrets
to the Present Litigation
In deciding whether the abandoned client communicated rel-
evant confidences or secrets to the disqualified attorney, the court
ship between the work product motion and the public perception of the bar, see
text accompanying notes 87-101 supra, the disqualifying party can show that the
benefits flowing from a denial -of the work product motion outweigh the detriments
only by establishing that he will be prejudiced if the work product is turned over.
He might succeed, for example, if he demonstrates that even though the dis-
qualification was not grounded on Canon 4, there remains a possibility that secrets
or confidences will be used against him. If the court determines that this possibility
exists, so that the disqualification could have been grounded on Canon 4 as well as
Canon 5 or 9, then the presumption is rebutted. The availability of the work
product then turns on the ad hoe balancing approach used when Canon 4 is in-
voked. See text accompanying notes 105 & 106 infra.
10 5 See notes 81-86 supra.
1o6 For a suggested balancing approach to the issue of the attorney-client privi-
lege, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Consti-
tutional Entitlement, 91 HAnv. L. Ruv. 464, 473-87 (1977).
The need to balance arises in any case of disqualification in which the court
invokes Canon 4, even when it is not the sole ground for disqualification. In such
a case, the burden of proof is on the movant, but when the disqualification is based
on Canon 5 or 9, the burden shifts to the adverse party. See note 104 supra &
accompanying text.
107 This analysis omits a third step-the substitute attorney must actually use
the confidences against the disqualifying party. The court should, however, omit
this step from its factual analysis of the case because, practically, it cannot deter-
mine if this event will occur.
The court cannot tell if substitute counsel will actually discover any confidences
which the work product contains because the court cannot inspect the work product.
See notes 118-21 infra & accompanying text. Furthermore, counsers inclination to
use confidences which he discovers in the work product, and the possibility that he
will use them unconsciously, are too speculative: the court should simply assume
that there is a constant probability that substitute counsel will find and use any
confidences which are in the work product.
WORK PRODUCT OF DISQUALIFIED ATTORNEYS
must start with the "substantial relationship" test.108 In disqualify-
ing the attorney under Canon 4, the court has decided that the
disqualified attorney's representation of the disqualifying party re-
lates so closely to the present litigation that the court must presume
that pertinent confidences and secrets were communicated to the
attorney.109
When considering a work product motion, the court should
continue this analysis by focusing on similarities between the fac-
tual situations and legal issues involved in the two representations."10
As the relationship between the representations grows more sub-
stantial, the greater the relevance to the present litigation of the
information presumed to have been imparted to the disqualified at-
torney. If the issues are identical (the attorney, for example, having
literally switched sides), the information must be deemed highly
pertinent to the present litigation."'
2. Presence of Confidences and Secrets in Work Product
The court must next evaluate the likelihood that such con-
fidences or secrets are in the work product prepared by disqualified
10 8 See note 43 supra & accompanying text.
109 See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In his First Wisconsin opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Judge Castle suggests that the "substantial relationship" test be
used to determine the availability of the work product, 584 F.2d at 215-16. He
suggests that the mere possibility that secrets or confidences are contained in the
work product and may, thus, be used to the detriment of the adverse party, calls
for denial of the work product motion.
This view, however, fails to give adequate weight to the interest of the aban-
doned client. Having experienced the loss of counsel of his choice, he should not
be compelled further to endure the harms stemming from denial of the work
product motion without further justification. Indeed, by advocating the use of the
same standard as that employed in deciding the disqualification question, Judge
Castle fails to recognize the extent to which disqualification reduces the likelihood
that confidences or secrets will be used to the detriment of the adverse party. See
text accompanying note 84-85 supra and text accompanying notes 112 & 114 infra.
"1o See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518
F.2d 751, 760 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring) (discussing determinants of
"substantial relationship").
111 In at least one circuit, consideration of the interests of the abandoned client
has led to a strict interpretation of "substantial relationship." An attorney will not
be disqualified unless the two representations involve virtually identical issues.
Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978).
See also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
754-56 (2d Cir. 1975); Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434
F. Supp. 691, 694 (D. Conn. 1976).
Where that is the rule, the court may assume, for purposes of the work product
motion, that the relationship between the two representations is extremely close;
hence, the confidences and secrets presumably passed from the disqualifying party
to the disqualified attorney should be deemed highly relevant to the present
litigation.
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counsel. The court presumes, for purposes of the disqualification
order, that relevant secrets or confidences were obtained by the
attorney from the disqualifying party. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the attorney inserted such information into his work
product in the present litigation.112  Confidences and secrets may
be retained by counsel in his mind without being translated into
written materials. Indeed, even if counsel prepared those materials
with the information in mind, the secrets and confidences may not
actually appear within them; thus, it is probable that only the in-
dividual who produced the work product could associate the infor-
mation with the various written materials. 113
This consideration, as well as the interests of the abandoned
client, convinced the Seventh Circuit, rehearing First Wisconsin
Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 14 to reject the presump-
tion that relevant confidences and secrets are embodied in the work
product. Rather, the court instructed the trial judge to examine
the written materials to ascertain whether there is a "taint of con-
fidentiality or other improper advantage" to the abandoned client
within them.15
Furthermore, the court placed the burden on the disqualifying
party to identify "specific confidential information" that may be
used to his detriment.0 16 In requiring a showing of "specific con-
fidential information," however, the court ignored the interests of
the disqualifying party as well as considerations of practicability.
Such a requirement compels the disqualifying party to reveal the
very information he seeks to preserve. 17 Preservation of confidences
112 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
IIS Of course, there is always the possibility that, although specific secrets or
confidences may not appear in the work product, the information that does appear
is of the type that could have been written only by someone with knowledge of se-
crets or confidences. See VAND. L. REv., supra note 30, at 831. For instance,
although a discovery request may not itself contain secrets or confidences, the dis-
qualified lawyer may have prepared the request, and listed the location of docu-
ments requested, as the result of knowledge of secrets or confidences. In that sense,
the work product would be tainted and disqualification alone might not totally solve
the problem. However, the point remains that such an eventuality is remote.
134 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
115 Id. 211 n.6. Although the court acknowledges that "other improper ad-
vantage," id., may accrue if the work product is turned over to successor counsel,
it gives no indication of what that advantage might be. The court does assert,
however, that such advantage might arise "from the very fact of the knowledge and
acquaintanceship acquired during the period of the prior representation." Id. 205.
The implication is that the court is merely adverting to the secrets which are
given the same protection under Canon 4 as are confidences. See definitions quoted
in note 5 supra.
l16 584 F.2d 201, 209.
117 Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
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and secrets is as important at the work product stage as it is at the
disqualification stage. Courts do not require the disqualifying party
to point to specific confidences when he seeks disqualification; 11s
neither should they at the work product stage.
Moreover, even if the disqualifying party were to identify con-
fidences or secrets that might be used against him, it is unlikely
that the trial judge, in examining the work product, could determine
if it contained such confidences or secrets. 119 Such information is
likely to be deeply embedded in the writings. Hence, documents
containing secrets or confidences may appear innocuous to a trial
judge whose familiarity with both the abandoned client, for whom
the work product was prepared, and the disqualifying party, whose
confidences and secrets may be embodied in the materials, is likely
to be minimal. 20
If the trial judge were able to study the documents exhaus-
tively, of course, he might be able to discover deeply embedded
confidences. However, the work product sought may consist of
literally thousands of documents. Even a cursory examination of
each document would require a huge amount of time. Thorough
review of the work product, then, is an unrealistic burden for the
trial judge.1 21 Hence, the constraints on judicial time and the
118 See, e.g., NCK Org. Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1976);
Emle Indus., Inc., v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); see also notes 43 & 44 supra & accompanying text.
The court in First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201
(7th Cir. 1978) (en banc), suggests that the trial court's examination of the work
product could occur in camera. Id. 209, 211 n.6. Although such an examination
precludes the abandoned client's successor attorney from gaining such information,
it would still require the disqualifying party to reveal it to the judge. See id. 213
(Castle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting T.C. Theatre Corp.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. at 269). Moreover, there are prac-
tical difficulties militating against this solution. See text following note 120 infra.
One commentator has suggested that a ipecial master be appointed to inspect
the work product. Access to Work Product, supra note 30, at 1072 n.83. This
suggestion should be rejected because the master faces the same practical difficulties
as the judge. See text following note 120 infra.
119 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 218 (7th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (Castle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120 Id. 212-13. Familiarity means a thorough understanding of the operations
of the parties. Indeed, documents embodying confidences or secrets may at first
glance seem innocuous to successor counsel as well as to the trial judge. In pre-
paring the case, however, the successor is likely to spend substantial time familiariz-
ing himself with all its aspects and studying the work product. Moreover, he is
in a better position to comprehend the relationship between the parties; hence, he is
more capable than the judge of discerning secrets or confidences contained in the
written materials. Id. 218.
121 Id. 212; Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management
Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954).
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preservation of the disqualifying party's secrets or confidences coun-
sel against adoption of the "specific confidential information" ap-
proach to the problem.
The likelihood that confidences or secrets appear in the work
product of the disqualified attorney must be analyzed to reconcile
competing interests. These include the abandoned client's interest
in mitigating the effects of the disqualification, the adverse party's
interest in preserving his information, and the judiciary's interest
in avoiding undue burdens upon the court's valuable time. Thus,
a presumption like that invoked to decide the disqualification issue
fails because it would not serve the abandoned client's interests. At
the same time, a requirement of "actual confidences" undermines the
interests of the disqualifying party and judiciary. To harmonize the
three competing interests, the courts should examine certain vari-
ables to draw inferences about whether the disqualified attorney
transmitted confidences to the work product. This approach is
consistent with the interests of the abandoned client because it
recognizes that different considerations govern the issues of work
product and disqualification. Moreover, it avoids the "specific con-
fidential information" requirement which is inimical to the dis-
qualifying party and judiciary. In implementing this approach,
the court should use information about the nature of the work
product and its relation to the attorney who actually received con-
fidences or secrets from the abandoned client.
a. Nature of Work Product
Certain products of legal work are more likely to contain con-
fidences or secrets than others.122 Publicly filed documents such as
briefs, pleadings, and motion papers, are unlikely to include such
.information because they are available for inspection by both the
adverse party and the court.i1s On the other hand, internal docu-
,ments, such as office memoranda, letters to clients, and transcripts of
strategy conferences, are most likely to contain confidences or se-
crets.-24 These materials, which embrace the attorney's tactical ap-
122 See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 216 &
n.8 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Castle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
123 Id. The disqualifying party is unlikely to contest the turnover of materials
that are part of the public record.
12 4 See VAim. L. REv., supra note 30, at 830, 832-33.
Although internal documents are more likely to contain confidences or se-
crets, some are much more likely to do so than others. The court must evaluate
the likelihood that the work product contains secrets or confidences by focusing on
the probable content of the document, not its "type."
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proach to the litigation and are, thus, protected from inspection
by any adverse party,21 may contain information which might be
used against the disqualifying party.
Other forms of work product, such as factual or descriptive
materials, cannot easily be viewed as likely or unlikely to contain
confidences. 2 6 For instance, in an action on a contract for the
sale of goods, a description of the inspection by the buyer on receipt
of the goods would rarely contain the seller's secrets. On the other
hand, an explanation of the performance promised by the seller
is more likely to include confidences or secrets about the seller's
operations procured by the attorney during his prior representation
of the seller. 27 The court, therefore, must deal with these types of
work products on an ad hoc basis.
b. Attorney Involvement
If a law firm rather than an individual attorney is disquali-
fied,128 it is probable that several attorneys produced the requested
work product. In addition, the individuals who prepared the writ-
ten materials in the present case may not have taken part in the
prior representation of the disqualifying party.'2 9 Hence, as the
125 Because of the likelihood that these doduments contain the "legal mind
work" of an attorney, they are protected from discovery by the "work product privi-
lege." Fu. B. Crv. P. 26(b)(3) states that "[T]he court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney." See also note 19 supra.
126As with internal documents, the court should focus here on the probable
content of the written materials. See note 124 supra.
127 Without examining the documents, the court could learn the types of docu-
ments requested and their general content by employing the same method used to
decide privilege claims. The disqualified attorney could prepare an inventory of
the documents, accompanied by affidavits containing a general description of their
contents. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Modification of the Mandate
at 7, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978)
(en banc). Of course, if the documents sought number in the hundreds or thou-
sands, such an inventory requires much work by an attorney and concomitant ex-
pense to the abandoned client. The inventory might simply list the number of
documents of a particular class and their general content. For example, one entry
might be: "Transcripts of five meetings between attorney and abandoned client,
in which the circumstances leading up to the execution of the contract were
discussed."
128DR 5-105(D) states: "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or
to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment."
129The courts have recognized that the degree of involvement of particular
attorneys in conflicting representations should be considered in determining whether
these individuals should be presumed to have obtained confidences or secrets. See,
e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1978) (quoting Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518
F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975)); Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978).
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overlap decreases between the individuals who presumably received
secrets and confidences and those who prepared the work product,
the possibility lessens that the written work embodies the disquali-
fying party's confidences.130
Thus, by examining the relationship between the two represen-
tations, the court may assess the relevance of the secrets and con-
fidences that were presumably passed from the disqualifying party to
the attorney or members of the firm. The court must then consider
the nature of the work product and the degree of attorney overlap to
determine the magnitude of the possibility that the written materials
contain such information. Having determined the likelihood that
the disqualifying party will be prejudiced if the work product is
turned over, the court must then turn its attention to the harm
which may result if the work product motion is denied.
B. Harmful Effects Emanating From Denial of
Work Product Motion
Denying the work product motion may produce two types of
harm. First, the delay and expense of duplicating the work product
may harm not only the abandoned client but also the disqualifying
party and the judicial system. Second, denial may prevent sub-
stitute counsel from thoroughly familiarizing himself with the case,
depriving the abandoned client of effective assistance of counsel.
While the first type of harm depends primarily on the volume of
For this reason, some courts have held that the presumption of receipt of con-
fidential information, see note 43 supra, is rebuttable where an attorney is alleged
to have received the confidence from others in his firm. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d at 754 (citing cases); Canadian
Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691, 694 (D. Conn.
1976) (evidence rebutted presumption). See also Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil
Co., 432 F. Supp. 694, 697 (E.D. Mo.), aft'd, 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) (refused to draw inference of confidential
information).
The relationship of particular lawyers to the disqualifying party's confidences
should also be considered when the court determines whether the work product is
likely to contain confidences or secrets.
The court should bear in mind, however, that even if attorneys who had access
to client confidences did not write the work product, they may have assisted those
who did. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 218 n.10
(7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Castle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13oTo ascertain the degree of overlap, the court might request affidavits from
the firm stating the names of attorneys who had contact with the disqualifying party
during the firm's representation of it, as well as the extent of that contact. The
court might also require that the affidavits accompanying the inventory of docu-
ments, see note 127 supra, include the names of attorneys who prepared the written
material. By comparing the names of those attorneys who are presumed to have
obtained secrets and confidences from the disqualifying party with the names of
those who prepared the work product for the abandoned client, the court can assess
the degree of overlap among those participating in the two representations.
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work which subsequent counsel must duplicate, the latter one de-
pends on the nature and complexities of the litigation.
1. Duplication of Work Product
If the work product request is denied, substitute counsel for
the abandoned client must duplicate some of the written work
already done by disqualified counsel. This duplication may involve
substantial expense and delay. Indeed, the financial burden alone
may be so staggering that the abandoned client is effectively barred
from further access to the courts.1' 1 Delay also may effectively bar
either party from further adjudication or give one party an undue
advantage. 3 2  For example, such delay may be used by one party
to induce his adversary to settle or withdraw his claim.1 33  Delay
affects the judge as well.134
131 In First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., for example, the work
product required more than a year and 15 lawyers to produce. 584 F.2d 201, 204
(7th Cir. 1978). Had the work product request been denied, the attorneys' fees
for duplication would have been enormous. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978)
(disqualifying firm had used 8 to 14 attorneys for over two years and collected
$2,500,000 in fees). After this disqualification decision, successor counsel con-
sidered requesting the disqualified attorneys' work product. Getting Kirkland Ellis
Westinghouse File, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1978, at 3, col. 1. See also Lasker, supra
note 92, at 250 (high cost of litigation bars most Americans from courts).
Although successor counsel, regardless of the outcome of the work product mo-
tion, will inevitably prepare many new materials, there are many documents pro-
duced by disqualified counsel which successor counsel could use without the need
for duplication. In First Wisconsin, for example, the contested work product con-
sisted of files on real estate transactions. These are of the type that would not
have to be duplicated by successor counsel if the work product motion were
granted.
Where the amount of work product in question is large, the burden of expense
and delay on the abandoned client, of course, is correspondingly great. Still, there
is a possibility that duplication of work product will not lead to added expense if
the abandoned client withholds payment or seeks reimbursement from disqualified
counsel. For an example of a lawsuit ified by an abandoned client seeking a refund
of fees paid to a disqualified attorney, see Conflicts: When Big Isn't Better, Nat'l
L.J., May 7, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
132 "[J]ustice delayed is justice denied-at least in part. If the case is im-
properly brought, the emotional and financial burden should be lifted from the de-
fendant as soon as possible . . . . If the claim is a good one then excessive delay
adds insult to injury for the plaintiff." Lasker, supra note 92, at 250.
133 In the context of the disqualification motion, courts have begun to recognize
that delay may be used by the disqualifying party to harass his opponent. E.g., Board
of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). Hence, some courts
refuse to allow interlocutory appeal from orders denying disqualification. See, e.g.,
Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1979)
(prospective ruling); Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d
1022, 1026-28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, The Appealability of
Orders Denying Motions For Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45
U. Cur. L. REv. 450 (1978).
134 "The costs . . . are not borne by the litigants alone. They are invariably
felt by the judges themselves who sense keenly the lack of time to reflect, and the
perils of hasty decision .... .. Lasker, supra note 92, at 250.
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Both the cost and delay of duplication depend on the volume of
the requested work product. Of course, the court must consider
more than the sheer number of documents. It must be wary of the
roles played by the disqualifying party and the bench in the pro-
liferation of the work product of the disqualified attorney. The
amount of written work prepared by the disqualified attorney in
some sense depends on the timing of the disqualification motion and
order. The later the motion to disqualify is made, the longer the
disqualified attorney has remained on the case. By raising the
matter of disqualification earlier, the disqualifying party could have
expedited the resolution of the issue: the disqualification would
have occurred sooner, and the volume of written work produced
by the attorney would have been reduced. The later the motion
to disqualify is made, the greater the likelihood that the motion
was timed to harass the abandoned client. 35 Thus, the disqualifying
party is responsible to some extent for the volume of work product
prepared by counsel before disqualification. The court must con-
sider this when deciding whether to reject the work product motion.
Similarly, the court must consider the amount of time elapsed
between the making of the motion to disqualify and the ruling on
the motion.136 When one party moves to disqualify, the abandoned
client is placed in a difficult position. If he permits his attorney
to continue working on the case, he risks wasting that work: the
attorney may be disqualified and the work product unavailable to
subsequent counsel. Should he pursue this reasonable course of
action,137 the amount of work done by the attorney becomes a func-
135 On the effect of delaying the motion to disqualify, see Central Milk Pro-
ducers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1306 (N.D. Ill.),
rev'd in part sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). The use of the motion to
disqualify for strategic purposes is discussed in Van Graafeiland, Lawyer's Conflict
of Interest--A Judge's View, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1977, at 1, col. 2. See also
Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1979);
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Community
Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Ross
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 447 F. Supp. 406, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Attorney Work Product, supra note 30, at 552-53 suggests that the disqualify-
ing party may deliberately seek to increase the size of the work product while the
disqualification motion is pending.
136See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 205 (7th
Cir. 1978) (en banc).
137 Altrmative courses of action are undesirable; thus, this course of action is
likely to be followed. The client may decide that counsel should do no further
work until the motion is ruled on, but the client then forfeits valuable time during
which his case could be developed. See Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion
that the Rehearing Be En Banc, at 6, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
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don of the timing of the court's decision on the motion. A dilatory
ruling on the disqualification motion contributes to the production
of work product by the disqualified attorney, augmenting the
amount of work which will be duplicated if the work product mo-
tion is denied. 38
The amount of work product which will have to be duplicated
by subsequent counsel, then, is determined by the volume of written
materials prepared for the case. When assessing the harm inflicted
on the abandoned client, however, the court must also consider the
extent to which the disqualifying party and court contributed to the
proliferation of the work product. The greater the contribution, the
more compelling the reason to permit the work product to be
turned over.
2. Danger of Inadequate Representation
The abandoned client faces a danger even more pernicious than
the burdens of duplication of the work product: denial of the
work product motion may cause inadequate legal representation.
This problem can take two forms. First, there may be portions of
the work product that substitute counsel is simply unable to re-
create. Second, without the work product, substitute counsel may be
significantly less prepared than opposing counsel.
Substitute counsel's ability to duplicate the work product de-
pends primarily on the timing of the disqualification. The earlier
that substitute counsel takes over the litigation, the more likely he
will be able to investigate and prepare as though he had been in-
volved from the outset. Moreover, at an early stage, the work
product of disqualified counsel will likely be less extensive and
correspondingly less helpful to the substitute.18 9
Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978). Alternatively, he may dismiss counsel. By
adopting this approach, however, the client not only loses the services of the attorney
most familiar with the case but permits a possibly meritless disqualification motion
to disrupt and debilitate his representation. Id.
338 In First Wisconsin, the trial court did not rule on the motion to disqualify
for 15 months. 584 F.2d at 205. (The disqualification decision is reported at
422 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1976)).
See Attorney Work Product, supra note 30, at 552-53; text accompanying notes
157-59 infra.
139 In some cases, however, the disqualified attorney may have spent much time
working on the case before the litigation commenced. Thus, even if the disqualifica-
tion were ordered early in the litigation, there might be a substantial body of work
product of use to successor counsel. In such a case, the considerations governing
disqualifications ordered late in the litigation are relevant.
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If, however, disqualification is ordered at a later stage of the
litigation,140 it becomes more difficult to reconstruct the information
necessary for representation. For example, witnesses may be un-
available, or real evidence may have disappeared or been altered.141
If substitute counsel enters the case so late that he is unable to re-
construct material factual information, the abandoned party may
be unable to proceed with his case.
42
At the same time, even if no key piece of information is missing,
the work product may be important to substitute counsel's under-
standing of the case. This depends, in the first instance, on the
complexity of the litigation. The more voluminous and intricate
the fact patterns and legal issues, the more difficult they are for suc-
cessor counsel to comprehend fully.
The successor's ability to handle the issues of the case is also
closely related to the timing of his assumption of the case. The
later he takes over, the more he must rely on facts and litigation
strategy developed by the disqualified attorney. 43 Even if he could
develop the case without resort to the work product, he would
likely have insufficient time to do so: with the litigation having
already progressed substantially, opposing counsel would be eager
to proceed. Having participated in the litigation throughout, he
will have already developed his case; thus, he will exert pressure on
successor counsel to expedite the litigation."-  Hence, as the com-
140 E.g., Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d
988 (8th Cir. 1978) (motion to disqualify made five years after firm had begun
work on lawsuit and two years after attorney in question, a former FTC lawyer,
had joined firm).
141 E.g., Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp.
691, 696 (D. Conn. 1976) ("The prejudice involved could be more than just a
surmountable hardship, since the affidavits indicate that the information collected
by [disqualified counsel] . . . may be essentially unavailable at this time or in
the future.").
142 E.g., id. 695 (denying work product would probably prevent successor from
making successful claim in main action).
Some courts have refused to disqualify an attorney where they fear that substi-
tution of counsel would significantly harm the party's case. E.g., Central Milk
Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978);
Ross v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 447 F. Supp. 406, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Cf. DR 5-101(B) (4) (lawyer, ordinarily precluded from accepting employment in
case in which he will testify, may undertake employment "if refusal would work
a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyear
[sic] or his firm as counsel in the particular case").
Even if the formal discovery process has not been completed, so that succes-
sor attorney may participate in it, he may not have a sufficient understanding of
his client's case to know how to approach the inquiry.
143 See notes 140-41 supra & accompanying text.
144 Of course, if opposing counsel believes that delay is advantageous, he would
refrain from urging his counterpart to hasten the development of his case. The
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plexity of the issues increases and the course of the litigation
progresses, the reason for the court to make the work product avail-
able becomes more compelling.
In gauging the effects on the abandoned client of a denial
of the work product request, then, the court must assess the likeli-
hood that he will be inadequately represented as well as the eco-
nomic burden and delay in litigation which will beset him. Against
these considerations, the court must balance the likelihood that
confidences and secrets passed from the disqualifying party to the
disqualified attorney will be used to that party's detriment should
the work product motion be granted. From this balancing, the
court must decide whether to authorize a turnover of the work
product to the abandoned client for use by his subsequent attorney.
IV. THE BALANCING ANALYSIS AND First Wisconsin
Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp.
In First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp.,
the court disqualified defendants' law firm due to its prior simul-
taneous representation of all parties to the litigation.145 Although
the court did not expressly rely on any of the canons as the basis for
disqualification, its use of the substantial relationship test implies
that it found the strictures of Canon 4 to have been contravened. 4 6
Accordingly, the subsequent request by the defendants, for authori-
zation to obtain certain work product produced by disqualified
counsel for use in the litigation,147 is subject to the balancing
analysis.
A. Likelihood That Confidences or Secrets Will Be
Used Against Adverse Party
The relationship between the subject matter of disqualified
counsel's prior representation of the disqualifying party and the
subsequent lawsuit assures the relevance to the litigation of con-
effects on the abandoned client, however, might still be detrimental. See note 132
supra & accompanying text.
145 422 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (disqualification decision). For a
brief discussion of the facts and procedural history of the case, see note 24 supra &
text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
146 Id. 498; 74 F.R.D. 625, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 390 (7th
Cir.), rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (work product decision).
147 Most of the work product requested was prepared prior to the filing of the
lawsuit. However, whether the work product was produced prior to or during the
litigation was of no consequence because the law firm that prepared it was held
to have been disqualified ab initio. 74 F.R.D. at 628.
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fidences and secrets presumably passed to counsel from the dis-
qualifying party: the primary suit in First Wisconsin concerned the
obligations owed by the defendants to the plaintiff as set forth in
documents drafted by disqualified counsel during its prior simul-
taneous representation 148 of both parties as general counsel. Thus,
the very heart of the prior representation was the focus of the
subsequent litigation.
Although it is certain that plaintiff's confidences and secrets
were relevant to the litigation, it is relatively unlikely that such
information was present in the work product. The written work at
issue consisted "essentially of summaries of loan files relating to
more than 300 complex [real estate] transactions." 149 Characterized
by the appellate court as "the result of routine lawyer work of a
type any competent lawyer . . . could accomplish," 150 the sum-
maries were purely factual. Moreover, the files which were the
subject of the summaries were available to both parties. 151 The
nature of the work product, then, suggests that it did not contain
the disqualifying party's confidences or secrets.152
Further, although not expressly stated in the facts of the case,
the work product was apparently prepared by attorneys who did
not have access to the confidences and secrets of the disqualifying
party. The work product was produced by fifteen members of the
disqualified law firm, who spent more than a year analyzing the
files and writing the summaries.' 53 It is probable that the attorneys
who prepared the work product were young associates.154 Whether
these attorneys also took part in the prior representation is not
clear; in any event, they likely had insufficient contact with the
disqualifying party to receive confidences or secrets.
B. Adverse Effects On Abandoned Client
If the court had denied the motion, successor counsel would
have had to duplicate substantial work. The documents at issue,
148422 F. Supp. 493, 494-96, 498 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (disqualification decision).




152 The opinion of the court sitting en banc includes an assertion that the work
product does not involve confidential information. Id. 204. In his opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Castle takes issue with this bald
declaration. Id. 211 & n.1. He concludes that it is possible that confidences were
contained in the work product and that this possibility alone is sufficient to deny
the work product request. Id. 217-19. His opinion is criticized at note 109 supra.
153 584 F.2d 201, 204 (majority opinion).
154Id. 218 n.10 (Castle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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representing more than a year of work by fifteen attorneys,155 con-
stituted a significant portion of the work done by the entire firm dur-
ing that period. 56 Thus, the expense of duplication, with the delay
in litigation which inevitably would result, is substantial.
Moreover, while plaintiff declared its intention to move to dis-
qualify counsel three months after the litigation commenced, it did
not actually file its motion until nearly five months after the action
was commenced. 157 Further, the court's ruling on the disqualifica-
tion motion was not entered for an additional fifteen months.158
Although the work product at issue appears to have been completed
months before the disqualification order was granted, the delays in
the filing of the motion and the ruling of the court lengthened the
period during which the firm remained on the case. These delays
undoubtedly contributed to the amount of work product produced
by disqualified counsel. 5 9
At the same time, a denial of the work product request might
have affected the adequacy of successor counsel's representation.
The loan files which were summarized in the work product contained
complex and highly technical documents. 60 Given adequate time,
successor counsel could have duplicated the summaries, but such
time might have been lacking. Two years had passed since the
plaintiff initiated the litigation, and successor counsel would have
had to request a delay of at least a year ' 6' in order to duplicate the
work product. Opposing counsel, having spent nearly two years
working on the case, would have been unlikely to agree to a long
155 Id. 204 (majority opinion).
15 6 As of July 1977, the disqualified firm, Foley & Lardner, had 138 lawyers.
Cantor, Law Firms Are Getting Bigger .. . and More Complex, 64 A.B.A.J. 215,
218 (1978).
'57 Brief for Appellants, supra note 17, at 10.
158 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.
1978) (en bane).
159 "The work product was voluminous at the time Plaintiff filed its motion
and had grown further by the end of the extended interval between the filing of
the motion and the Decision and Order granting it." Brief for Appellants, supra
note 17, at 13 (footnote omitted).
160 Id. 15.
161 This assumes that the substitute firm would be able to assign 15 attorneys
to duplicate the summaries. The disqualified firm employed 15 lawyers for one year
to create them. See 584 F.2d at 204. Of course, if the substitute firm were able
to assign more than 15 attorneys to the task of preparing the summaries, the docu-
ments might be completed in a shorter period.
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delay.162 Thus, the substitute firm would have been placed in a
situation in which it would likely have been unable to prepare fully
the needed summaries. Unless the work product was available, the
substitute firm may have been unable to provide adequate repre-
sentation.
C. Balancing
The result reached by the Seventh Circuit in its en banc re-
hearing of First Wisconsin was proper. The magnitude and com-
plexity of the work product and the timing of the disqualification
order would have translated into great expense and delay, and prob-
able prejudice to the defendants, had the work product request been
denied. These effects outweigh the possibility that confidences and
secrets would have been used to the plaintiff's detriment if the
motion had been granted. The nature of the work product, and the
identity of the attorneys who probably produced it, minimize the
likelihood that the plaintiff would have been disadvantaged.
CONCLUSION
The work product of a disqualified attorney should be made
available to substitute counsel except when withholding it is re-
quired to enforce the ethical purpose of disqualification. 163 The
only ground for disqualification which justifies withholding the
work product is the possibility that secrets or confidences reposed in
an attorney will be used to his client's detriment.
The mere possibility of such use, however, does not justify a
denial of the work product motion. The harm to the client whose
attorney was disqualified is potentially too serious to be permitted
without compensating benefits. Thus, courts should employ a
balancing analysis to determine the availability of the work product:
-they should weigh the possibility that secrets or confidences will be
used to the disqualifying party's detriment if the work product is
made available, against the harm to the abandoned client if the work
product is withheld.
16 2 The court might have ordered the delay. In that case, however, opposing
counsel could have sought to use the delay to his advantage. See note 109 supra.
163 It should be noted that the work product issue as discussed in this Com-
ment raises substantial questions of professional ethics, fundamental fairness, and
the spiraling cost of litigation. The scope of this Comment, however, has not per-
mitted extensive focus on these issues.
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Courts have come to recognize that when an attorney is dis-
qualified, his abandoned client may be severely disadvantaged. 6 4
In proposing a balancing analysis, this Comment seeks to insure that,
when the issue shifts from the attorney's conduct to the attorney's
work product, courts pay adequate attention to the interests of the
abandoned client.
:'(4 See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739
(2d Cir. 1978); Norman NorelL, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp.
127, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers,
Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691, 695-97 (D. Conn. 1976).
